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Reply to Ferzan’s Review of Self-Defense, Necessity, and Punishment 
 
I thank Kimberly Kessler Ferzan for her review of my book Self-Defense, Necessity, and 
Punishment (hereafter SNP).1 She has some complimentary things to say about me and the 
book, and some less complimentary ones. In my reply, as is to be expected from replies, I 
will focus on the latter. She attacks one claim of mine, and otherwise deals exclusively 
with structure and (alas!) tone. I take up these issues in this order. 
Ferzan only addresses one “central claim” of mine by actual argument. This argument 
turns out to be incoherent. To wit, she first characterizes the claim quite correctly, but 
when she then moves on to criticize it, she suddenly misrepresents it, contradicting her 
very own earlier correct description of it. Let me explain.  
Ferzan – correctly – attributes the claim to me that culpable aggressors have no right 
against the use of unnecessary force; rather, unnecessary force would be prohibited by 
what I call a “precautionary principle.” Ferzan – again correctly – paraphrases my position 
as follows: 
[I]f someone culpably tries to kill you, and you know you can stop him by pinching 
him, punching him, or even pummeling him, but you instead opt to kill him, you do 
not wrong him. Instead, your action is unjustified because you may be incorrect 
about the facts – it may be that your attacker is actually innocent (drugged, for 
example) and so would be wronged by unnecessary force. But you do not wrong 
culpable aggressors by using unnecessary force.2 
Ferzan is “interested … in what lies beneath” this view and explains that I invoke “both 
the concepts of reciprocity and hypocrisy,” and allegedly I run them together. In fact, 
however, I merely invoke arguments from hypocrisy to illustrate that the principle of 
reciprocity on which I rely is extremely plausible. She then focuses on this principle (she 
says “claim”) and states: 
A reciprocity claim, as I take Steinhoff to be defining it, is the idea that rights exist 
because of a mutual agreement to respect each other’s interests. [That is not my 
claim at all, and she did not need to “take me” to be defining anything, since I 
explicitly and prominently did define the reciprocity principle on p. 91. I will come 
back to that.] 
She then argues that this claim is “too strong” and continues: 
Let’s consider Steinhoff's reciprocity argument. Steinhoff thinks that a natural 
implication of a reciprocity account is that if you aim to kill me, then I do not wrong 
you by shooting you, even if I know that I could just step on your toe. By having 
tried to kill me, you are no longer entitled to my respecting your interests as rights. 
 
1 Uwe Steinhoff, Self-Defense, Necessity, and Punishment: A Philosophical Analysis 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2020). 
2 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “‘Self-Defense, Necessity, and Punishment: A Philosophical 
Analysis’, by Uwe Steinhoff” (review), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, available at 
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/self-defense-necessity-and-punishment-a-philosophical-analysis/, 
accessed on 12. January 2021. There are no page numbers. All quotes are from this review, 
unless otherwise indicated.  
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This last quoted passage is a correct interpretation of my position.3 Almost everything 
she says after isn’t. To wit, she claims, and let me quote at length: 
But Steinhoff takes this further. Once there is a loss of reciprocity, it is in rem. If you 
try to hit me, then not only may I hit you, but so too may Peter, Paul, and Mary (93). 
Let’s be clear: Peter, Paul, Mary, and I may all hit you because you no longer have 
rights against being hit. Anyone may hit you. … Combining Steinhoff's conception 
of proportionality with his construal of necessity should yield the implication that if 
you are stealing an apple, and you have lawn signs that advocate, “Maim the apple 
thieves!” then not only the apple owner, but Peter, Paul, and Mary may maim you. 
Such a broad view of reciprocity, however, strikes me as potentially being a double-
edged sword. If A is out of the social contract, not only with B, but also with C, D, 
and E, so that now C, D, and E are not bound against harming A proportionately to 
his initial transgression, then should we worry that A is also out of the contract? And 
if this is true, then won’t A be free to hurt C, D, and E because he is no longer bound 
to respect their rights? … Now, it strikes me as implausible that there is a complete 
free-for-all against you in which Peter, Paul, and Mary may all permissibly hit you 
(and this is implausible not just because I take them to be folk singing pacifists). But 
it strikes me as even more implausible that after trying to hit me, you would not 
wrong any other random persons, say Larry, Moe, and Curly, by hitting them 
because the reciprocity has broken down. Maybe Steinhoff has something more 
limited in mind, but it is not clear how he plans to ground it and he does not address 
this potential implication of his view. 
First of all, again, I fail to understand Ferzan’s alleged need for speculating about how 
limited or unlimited my principle of reciprocity is. As already noted above in brackets, I 
explicitly state it on p. 91 of SNP: 
Reciprocity: If a culpable actor unjustifiably harms interests of others that are 
protected by their rights, then he or she has (all else being equal) no valid complaint 
against acts that harm equal or less important interests of the actor (but he does have 
a right against acts that harm his or her interests unnecessarily and 
disproportionately). Accordingly, the actor’s own relevant interests are not protected 
by rights anymore due to his or her own culpable violation of the rights of others.  
Clearly, this principle is formulated as a one-way street. (Moreover, in the footnote 
after “others,” which I have omitted in the quote, I state: “Note that this principle is purely 
a principle of rights forfeiture, not rights possession.”) It does not as much as suggest, let 
alone imply, the insane view Ferzan sees fit to associate my account of reciprocity with, 
namely that an aggressor can relieve himself of his duties by violating them. 
Second, the term “social contract” appears exactly once in SNP, namely in passing and 
in a discussion of Hohfeld. However, I indeed use the term “contract” when discussing 
Kant with regard to his view (which I endorse) that culpable aggressors have no right 
against unnecessary force. I put “contract” in scare quotes there, though, which should 
have been some indication that I did not deem it to be a literal contract or agreement. 
Incidentally (and rather unsurprisingly), Kant also believed in a one-way street regarding 
the aggressor’s rights-forfeiture. 
 The third point brings me back to my charge of incoherence against Ferzan’s critique. 
Let me repeat parts of two quotes from above: 
 
3 Or at least it is close enough for present purposes. To be precise, however: I do not claim 
that you have forfeited all your rights by a culpable attack on my life, but only rights of 
equivalent (or less than equivalent) strength. For example, you might retain the right not to 
be slowly tortured to death. 
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Steinhoff thinks that a natural implication of a reciprocity account is that if you aim 
to kill me, then I do not wrong you by shooting you, even if I know that I could just 
step on your toe. By having tried to kill me, you are no longer entitled to my 
respecting your interests as rights. 
As I already said, she is correct about this. But then she says:  
But Steinhoff takes this further. … If you try to hit me, then not only may I hit you, 
but so too may Peter, Paul, and Mary (93). Let’s be clear: Peter, Paul, Mary, and I 
may all hit you because you no longer have rights against being hit. 
The claims in this latter quote a) do not follow from the claims referred to in the former, 
b) misrepresent my actual position, c) contradict Ferzan’s very own initial correct 
characterization of that position, which was this (which I also quote again here): 
[I]f someone culpably tries to kill you, and you know you can stop him by pinching 
him, punching him, or even pummeling him, but you instead opt to kill him, you do 
not wrong him. Instead, your action is unjustified because you may be incorrect 
about the facts – it may be that your attacker is actually innocent (drugged, for 
example) and so would be wronged by unnecessary force. But you do not wrong 
culpable aggressors by using unnecessary force. 
Yes, indeed. So I say that although a culpable lethal aggressor has no right not to be 
unnecessarily killed, killing him would nonetheless still be unjustified. But if it is 
unjustified, then it is of course not true that you may kill him. So when Ferzan says that on 
my account “Peter, Paul, Mary, and I may all hit you because you no longer have rights 
against being hit” (emphases changed), she is thereby ascribing not only a view to me that 
I do not have and that does not follow from my account, but in fact the opposite view than 
the one I have and that does follow from my account.  
This becomes even more ironic considering the fact that in a section informatively 
entitled “The Importance of the Distinction between Permissibility and Liability for the 
Limiting Conditions,” I criticized her for having (apparently still not overcome) difficulties 
in making this distinction strictly and in recognizing its normative implications: 
Kimberly Ferzan, for example, explicitly distinguishes permissibility from liability 
but nevertheless argues “that liability is its own interesting conceptual and normative 
path to permissibility, and the reason it is permissible to kill culpable aggressors is 
because they are liable to defensive force.” However, liability is no path to 
permissibility at all: that someone is liable to attack does not make it permissible to 
attack him (not even if one bars overriding necessity justifications, e.g.: if one 
knocked down the unjust attacker, terrorists will blow up a pre-school). ( SNP, 69; 
compare also 204, note 106.)4 
So let’s summarize this: I criticize Ferzan for not realizing that someone’s liability to be 
attacked does not make it permissible to attack him;5 she then, when merely describing my 
view, does so correctly; but the moment she criticizes my view, she attributes her mistaken 
views on the connection between liability and permissibility to me, and then conveniently 
concludes that my account has implausible implications. If you meditate on this for a 
 
4 She makes the explicit distinction in Kimberly Kessler Ferzan “Culpable Aggression: 
The Basis for Moral Liability to Defensive Killing,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 9 
(2011-2012), pp. 669-697, at 671. The Ferzan quote is from Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, 
“Provocateurs,” Criminal Law and Philosophy 7(2013), pp. 597-622, at 606. 
5 Quong makes the same mistake – which might explain the intuitions of his which Ferzan 
invokes. I spend quite some time explaining in SNP, namely in the section just mentioned, 
why these intuitions have no force given that they rest on precisely such mistakes. See in 
that context also my discussion of David Boonin on pp. 76-77. 
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moment, you might come to understand why I, as Ferzan notes, sometimes show an 
“evident frustration with other philosophers.” 
Ferzan also has problems with the structure of my book. She claims that the book fails 
to “present a clear and coherent vision” and that “the whole is less than the sum of its 
parts.” Well, given that, as we just saw, she so egregiously distorts a central claim of mine 
that was explicitly formulated and there clear to see for all, her failure to recognize the 
whole constituted by the parts might not necessarily be indicative of shortcomings in my 
presentation. Moreover, she herself concedes that “the coverage and cohesiveness of the 
book’s general topics is quite good,” and then rather convincingly explains why it is good. 
She is less convincing, though, when it comes to explaining where the book’s structure 
leaves something to be desired. For example, she says that “[n]otably, the book is not 
about all types of necessity arguments – criminal law theorists looking for their standard 
prison escape cases, discussions of civil disobedience, or queries about torture will find 
that these are lacking.” I do not know what she means by “types of necessity arguments.” 
SNP is about basic moral and legal justifications, like the self-defense and indeed the 
lesser evil or necessity justification. There is no separate “standard prison case” 
justification. Rather, (certain) prison escapes are, yes, cases to which necessity 
justifications can be applied. And while it is of course good to discuss by way of 
illustration some cases to show how the general justification is to be applied – which I do – 
it is hardly the task of such a foundational study to go through all the possible applications 
to cases. Moreover, it is somewhat odd that she mentions torture. I have written an entire 
book On the Ethics of Torture.6 If Ferzan is interested in how the self-defense justification 
or different types of emergency justifications are to be applied to the case of torture, 
maybe she should check there. 
Likewise, when Ferzan states that the book is not “about all of punishment (rather it 
focuses almost exclusively on Kit Wellman’s argument about why the state has the 
exclusive right to punish),” then I would like to point out that it need not be about “all of 
punishment.” I define punishment, and then explain how it can be justified. I do so by 
relying on those earlier discussions of forfeiture, justification, necessity, proportionality, 
the subjective element, and so on that I had already offered in the context of the self-
defense justification and indicating how and why (if at all) these elements differ in the 
context of punishment. Relying in the later part of a book on what one has already done in 
the earlier parts is hardly a revolutionary concept and might speak more for the 
cohesiveness of a work than against it. Furthermore, I discuss the question of exclusive 
state punishment because this question does not appear in the context of self-defense, and I 
discuss it with the example of Wellman because he is the one who has not rested content 
with giving vague hints but actually provided a sustained argument for the exclusive right 
of the state to punish (an argument with which I happen to disagree).  
Ferzan also laments that I seem “to miss other arguments in the literature that contradict 
[my] views, including failing to engage the difficult questions of public authority that 
Heidi Hurd’s Moral Combat raises for [my] view (341), or the intermediate position for 
justifications suggested by Antony Duff’s concept of ‘warranted behavior.’” In reply, let 
me note that it might tell us something that Duff’s “intermediate position” and the 
terminological distinctions connected to it have not caught on. Furthermore, Duff 
constructs an analogy between practical (or legal) and epistemic justification, and then 
analogizes what he labels “straightforward” or “strong” justification to the epistemic 
concept of truth (not to the concept of epistemic justification). In other words, he construes 
 
6 Uwe Steinhoff, On the Ethics of Torture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2013). 
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this kind of justification as fact-relative.7 Given, however, that the part of SNP Ferzan likes 
most and praises quite a bit (and in fact seems to endorse) is exactly the part where I show 
that fact-relative justification cannot work, it would appear that my arguments undermine 
Duff’s, not the other way around. I also criticize Hurd’s account of objective justification 
explicitly. However, Ferzan mentions Hurd’s account of “practical authority” here and 
refers to a page in SNP where I talk about public authority justifications. So, apparently, 
Ferzan thinks that Hurd’s critique of practical authority applies to public authority 
justifications. Maybe Ferzan thinks that because the two sound quite similar. Yet they are 
not. Hurd’s charge against practical authority amounts to the claim that “obedience to law 
of the sort required by the exercise of practical authority violates a central principle of 
rationality,” namely that you should act “on the balance of reasons.”8 Yet the public 
authority justification is simply a justification police officers, for example, can avail 
themselves of when regulating the traffic while private citizens can’t. So one concerns 
obligations toward the law, the other special justifications given by the law (or morality) to 
agents occupying certain roles. These things are clearly not the same, and I would really 
like to know which principle of rationality, in Ferzan’s view, the public authority 
justification is supposed to violate. 
Another problem for the structure of SNP, according to Ferzan, is my “constant 
injection of others’ arguments.” One would think that this is not such a bad thing. To be 
sure, the downside of developing and defending one’s own views while meticulously 
dealing with objections and alternative approaches is indeed that it will make a book 
“dense.” Yet on the other hand, the downside of achieving simplistic beauty and benign 
accessibility by ignoring objections (something quite a few recent contributions to 
especially the self-defense literature do) is that it will make a book thin. From a scholarly 
perspective, the former is to be preferred to the latter. But there might indeed be some 
disagreement between Ferzan and me on what is required for scholarly activity. For 
example, Ferzan grants that I have “novel insights and new connections.” Yet that does not 
keep her from answering with a merely “tentative yes” when asking “whether those who 
are well versed in self-defense theory should read the book.” At least if those “well 
versed” want to remain well versed, let alone advance the debate, one should think that 
they actually must read a book that offers novel insights and connections. 
Let me finally come to Ferzan’s complaints about my “tone,” which preoccupies her 
quite a bit. Ferzan states that the book “is presented as ire at the work of others.” That is 
absolutely true. And the one who presents it in this way is none other than Ferzan herself 
in her review. In fact, she appears to be extraordinarily committed to presenting it as such. 
Yet the examples – just two – she adduces for my “jarring … vitriol” are somewhat 
anticlimactic. To wit, Ferzan bemoans that I get “no farther than the second paragraph of 
[my] preface before attacking ‘a group of just war theorists who like to call themselves, 
“revisionists”’ (ix).” What does that have to do with tone? I do, indeed, state in the preface 
that I disagree with this group of philosophers on a number of points, which I list. And of 
course my formulation that they “like to call themselves ‘revisionists’” suggests that I do 
not accept their self-description. But I am certainly entitled to reject other philosophers’ 
self-image, am I not? So if Ferzan finds anything jarring here, then it is probably because 
she accepts the self-description of those scholars as well as some of their views. But then 
she should simply say so and explain where I go wrong instead of hiding her substantive 
disagreement behind complaints about tone. 
 
7 Antony Duff, “Rethinking Justifications,” Tulsa Law Review 39 (2004), pp. 829-850. 
8 Heidi M. Hurd, Moral Combat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 69. 
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Her second example is that I “respond[] to an argument by one philosopher with a one-
word sentence: ‘Wrong’(314).” Not quite (that’s two words: I’m adapting). Ferzan fails to 
mention that after this one-word sentence there comes a fifty-one-word sentence that 
explains why it is wrong and indeed merely summarizes a whole section where I had 
explained that in excruciating detail. In short, Ferzan’s choice of these two examples as 
supposed evidence for my “vitriol” in fact unwittingly works as evidence that her implicit 
rules of academic civility are somewhat petty and pedantic. Less obsession about tone and 
more concern for substance might be good methodological advice for all philosophers. 
You find a lot of substance in SNP. And if you nonetheless dislike its tone, allow me to say 
what you can either interpret as one word or three: oops-a-daisy. 
 
